AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LIABILITY TO
THE ADA

Christine Neaglet
In recent years, the development of a large body of federal antidiscrimination law has had a significant impact on the American
workplace. Due to the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),
and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), employers have become
cognizant that their actions, or the actions of their employees, may subject
them to legal liability. This heightened awareness has shaped the
employment relationship as employers strive to comply with the
discrimination statutes and employees continue to assert their rights under
these laws.
The hostile work environment theory of liability has had a profound
effect on employment law. It is a recognized and well-established theory
of recovery under Title VII. 1 In the past, however, the hostile work
environment cause of action had been confined to Title VII in its
application. Currently, there is a controversial question on the horizon: can
a hostile work environment theory of liability exist under the ADA?
This issue has emerged from recent ADA case law. The ADA is a
nebulous statute that includes several terms and definitions that may be
subject to various interpretations. Therefore, many of the early lawsuits
under the ADA focused on clarifying terms such as "disability. ' 2 In fact,

t B.A. in Political Science, summa cum laude, Adelphi University 1998. This
comment is dedicated to my beloved late grandfather, Frank J. Brigante, who taught me to
pursue my dreams and "never look back." I would also like to thank my family and friends
for their perpetual love and support.
1. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that a claim
of "hostile environment" sexual harassment is a form of discrimination that is protected by
Title VII); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that "the relationship
between an employee and his working environment is of such significance as to be entitled
to statutory protection.").
2. See Thomas P. Murphy, Disabilities Discrimination Under the Americans With
DisabilitiesAct, 36 CATH. LAW 13, 19 (1995) ("Many employers have struggled with the
definition of the term 'disability' because the statute does not offer much guidance in this
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"[s]ince the passage of the ADA, much of the material discussing [its]
employment provisions has focused on the duty to provide reasonable
accommodation. ' 3 Currently, the focus is shifting to the hostile work
environment question. While some criticize extending the theory from
Title VII to the ADA, several federal district courts have held that hostile
work environment claims are actionable under the ADA.4 Although no
federal appeals court has explicitly ruled on the issue of whether such
claims exist, several circuits have assumed that courts will recognize
hostile work environment claims relating to disability. While some view
the recognition of hostile work environment claims under the ADA as a
logical and necessary extension of the theory, others see it as one more
superfluous obstacle in the minefield of discrimination liability employers
already face.6
This comment will explore whether the expansion of hostile work
environment liability to the ADA is desirable and, more importantly,
whether it is even workable. Part I examines the ADA itself, including the
relevant language of the statute, the legislative history, and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations issued
pursuant to the statute. Part II analyzes the recent trend of employee-based
lawsuits against their employers under the ADA for creating or acquiescing
to a hostile work environment. Part III contrasts the ADA and Title VII to
determine if the construction, history, and interpretation of the statutes are
similar enough to permit the extension of the hostile work environment
theory to the ADA. Part IV identifies and analyzes the arguments in favor
of and against applying hostile work environment liability to the ADA.
Part V examines Frank Ravitch's proposal for using a modified Title VII
hostile work environment framework to provide a remedy for workplace
harassment under the ADA. Finally, Part VI provides some suggestions
and final thoughts on this issue.

area.").
3. Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and
Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 1475, 1476 (1994).
4. See William C. Smith, Cruel, Costly Comments: Businesses May Pay for Taunts
Against Disabled Workers, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 24, 24 (stating that courts that have
recognized the cause of action include federal district courts in Georgia, Oklahoma, Illinois,
and Washington, D.C.).
5. See Tenth Circuit Ducks ADA Harassment Claim, N.M. EMP. L. LETER (Hinkle,
Cox, Eaton, Coffield & Hensley, P.L.L.C.), Sept. 1999, at 4 [hereinafter Tenth Circuit].
6. See infra Part IV.
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I.

EXAMINATION OF THE ADA

A.

Statutory Language

The text of the ADA is critical to the determination of whether a cause
of action for hostile work environment liability exists under the ADA. The
language of the statute provides an excellent starting point for analysis.
The relevance of the discussed provisions will emerge more clearly in
subsequent sections. At this point, it suffices to merely identify the
germane portions of the statute so that they may be referenced when the
issue of hostile work environment claims under the ADA is explored
further.
First, it is useful to examine the congressional findings because they
provide the justifications and motivations for the enactment of the ADA.7
Congress reports that 43,000,000 Americans are disabled in some way and
that this number is increasing! Historically, society has discriminated
against disabled individuals by isolating and segregating them; this
discrimination continues to be a pervasive social problem affecting many
The unequal treatment of disabled
areas, including employment.9
individuals stems from "stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society."'
Unlike individuals who face discrimination because of race, color,
sex, national origin, religion, or age, Congress found that individuals who
suffer because of their disability are often left without legal recourse
against such discrimination."
Congress' recognition of this fact is
indicative of its intent to provide disabled individuals with the same rights
that protected classes receive under Title VII and the ADEA. However,
since hostile work environment is a permissible theory of liability under
Title VII, disabled individuals are not on equal footing with other protected
classes if they have no legal remedy to redress harassment in the
workplace. Thus, these legislative findings strengthen the argument in
favor of recognizing hostile work environment as a viable cause of action
under the ADA.
Finally, the legislative findings also indicate that society bears the cost
of employment discrimination against disabled individuals when such

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a) (West 2000).
Id. § 12101(a)(1) (West 2000).
Id. §§ 12101(a)(2), (3) (West 2000).
Id. § 12101(a)(7) (West 2000).
Id. § 12101(a)(4) (West 2000).
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12
individuals are kept in a position of dependency and non-productivity.
Therefore, a proper goal of Congress is to "assure equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
such individuals. 1 3
Congress also addresses the purpose of the ADA and breaks it down
into four prongs:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;

(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of
individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
of discrimination
commerce, in order to address the major areas
14
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
These explicitly stated purposes highlight the importance of resolving
the uncertainty of whether hostile work environment claims may be
brought under the ADA. Consistency and clarity cannot be achieved until
this issue is resolved.
In addition to the findings and purpose of the ADA, the statutory
definition of discrimination contained in Title I of the ADA is crucial to the
issue at hand.' 5 The question of whether hostile work environment claims
are viable under the ADA depends on whether disability harassment can be
defined as "discrimination." As a general rule, the statute provides: "No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to...
[various employment practices] and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment."' 16 This language of "terms, conditions, and privileges of
to the
employment" supports extending hostile work environment liability
7
ADA because Title VII contains virtually identical language.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. § 12101(a)(9) (West 2000).
Id. § 12101(a)(8) (West 2000).
Id. § 12101(b) (West 2000).
Title I is the section of the ADA applicable to employment. Id. §§ 12111-12117.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2000).
See, e.g., Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106 (S.D. Ga. 1995).

2001]
B.

HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LIABILITY

Legislative History

The findings discussed above are the distilled product of the vast
legislative history of the ADA. Yet, it is still useful to delve further into
the legislative history because it will shed more light on the policy reasons
underlying the statute's enactment.
As the findings demonstrate, the discrimination targeted by the ADA
imposes a great burden on the government and society in general. Failure
to allow disabled individuals to enter the workforce and perform at their
highest capacity costs the United States economy between $200 billion and
$300 billion a year in support payments and lost productivity." However,
the overwhelming majority of unemployed disabled individuals indicated
that they wanted to work and could not find a job.19 In fact, eighty-two
percent of disabled individuals said they would give up their government
benefits in exchange for a full-time job. 20
The legislative history also reveals employers' fears about employing
disabled individuals, such as increased insurance costs and expensive
workplace accommodations. 2' However, a study of 1,452 disabled
employees should prove that these fears are unfounded. It concluded that
ninety-one percent of the disabled workers had an average or above
average performance rating, ninety-three percent rated average or above
average with respect to job stability, seventy-nine percent had at least
average attendance records, and the disabled employees' co-workers did
not resent the accommodations that were made to allow the disabled
individuals to perform their duties. 22 "The continuing effect of mistaken
stereotypes across the spectrum of employers.., is likely the single
greatest factor in keeping most working age adults with disabilities out of
the economic mainstream of our Nation."3
Understanding the policy behind the ADA is necessary in order to
determine whether a hostile work environment theory of liability comports
with the policy. Disability harassment is often predicated on stereotypes
and myths about the disabled, and may interfere with disabled individuals'
productivity in the workforce. Therefore, it seems as if the legislative
history of the ADA not only permits, but demands, that courts recognize
hostile work environment as a theory of recovery under the ADA.

18. Ben Cristal, Note, Going Beyond the Judicially Prescribed Boundaries of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 493, 495 (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at9 (1989)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 496.
23. Id. at 495-96 (quoting 135 CONG. REc. S10,765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989))
(statement of Sen. Simon).
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EEOC Regulation

The EEOC has issued Proposed Guidelines on harassment that allow
individuals discriminated against in the workplace because of race, color,
religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability to bring a harassment
claim. 24 The guidelines, though not binding, bring the ADA into the Title
VII hostile work environment rubric and indicate that the EEOC supports
such an extension of hostile work environment liability.1 Clearly, a hostile
work environment cause of action is feasible under the ADA.
II.

RECENT TREND: HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CASES BROUGHT
UNDER THE ADA

A.

District CourtDecisionsRecognizing the Hostile Work Environment
Cause ofAction Under the ADA

In Haysman v. Food Lion,26 a federal district court in Georgia ruled
that a harassment claim is actionable under the ADA. Haysman, the
assistant manager of a supermarket, suffered an on-the-job injury to his
back and knee that required surgery. 27 As a result, his doctor ordered
limitations on his physical activity, and gave him a permanent disability
rating of seven percent.28 In addition, the physical injury exacerbated
Haysman's pre-existing emotional disorder, so he was given a twenty
percent permanent partial disability rating based on his psychological
problems. 29 When he returned to work, Food Lion created a special
position for Haysman that required him to perform various lightweight
duties such as dusting shelves and greeting customers.30 Although this was
a lower level position than the one Haysman previously held as assistant
store manager, Haysman was no longer qualified for his prior position
because of his inability to perform heavy lifting and his sporadic attendance
due to his injury3
Haysman contended that when he returned to work after being on
disability, his supervisors subjected him to verbal harassment and physical

24. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National
Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1609).
25. Id.
26. 893 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
27. Id. at 1097.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1102-03.
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abuse.32 He alleged that the store manager accused him of "snowballing"
the company with his disability.33 Haysman also alleged that the assistant
manager told him he had to work every minute of his shift, regardless of his
pain, and that he "would break him" and was going to "ride him until he
quit.'' 4 Additionally, Haysman said his supervisor used extreme profanity
toward him, and he would strike or kick Haysman's injured back or knee
when he passed by.35 Haysman argued that Food Lion failed to reasonably
accommodate him because the harassment was an attempt to force him to
leave his employment with the store."
The court ruled that the type of harassment Haysman alleged is
actionable under the ADA, but it rejected the "reasonable accommodation"
analysis.3 7 Instead, the court held that the claim should be based on either a
hostile work environment or a constructive discharge theory.38 The court
adopted the Title VII framework for hostile work environment, 39 and found
that a material question of fact existed as to whether Food Lion was liable
to Haysman for fostering a hostile work environment.40
This case provides a significant benchmark for ADA hostile work
environment liability. Despite the fact that an employer did not deny a
disabled person employment, and although it provided reasonable
accommodations for his disability, the court indicated that an employer can
still be exposed to liability under the ADA for creating a verbally and
physically abusive work environment.
Lanni v. New Jersey41 presents another, more recent case inwhich a
federal district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and allowed a jury to hear an employee's ADA-based hostile work
environment claim. 42 In Lanni, the plaintiff-employee, a radio dispatcher
for a division of the state Department of Environmental Protection, suffered
from dyslexia and other related neurological impairments which resulted in
slow speech and memory problems.43 The alleged harassment by coworkers and supervisors included pasting pictures of Lanni on a life-sized
turkey decoy and onto a photograph of a person in a wheelchair; repeatedly
and publicly correcting Lanni's spelling mistakes (once by leaving an open
32. Id. at 1098.
33. Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1106.
Id.

39. The court identifies four elements of a hostile work environment claim by relying
on sexual harassment precedent. See infra p. 727 and note 85.
40. Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1107.
41. 177 F.R.D. 295 (D.N.J. 1998).
42. See Smith, supranote 4 (discussing the legal repercussions of Lanni).
43. Lanni,177 F.R.D. at 298.
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dictionary next to a highlighted error in the logbook); and calling him
derogatory names, such as "dunce," "stupid," and "moron.' 4 Lanni also
claimed his co-workers joked about shooting him and drew their guns in
his presence. 45
In defense, the State contended that such joking was good-natured and
consensual, and that Lanni himself often participated in the teasing.46 The
State's lawyer, Barbara Ann Berreski, cited instances when co-workers
routinely gave Lanni rides home and collected money for him when his
house burned down to illustrate that the conduct was not mean-spirited and
that no animus was harbored toward Lanni.47 Nevertheless, the jury
awarded Lanni $227,000 in damages, making it one of the first verdicts for
a plaintiff in a lawsuit alleging hostile work environment under the ADA.48
However, while many federal district courts seem willing to embrace
49
the Title VII hostile work environment theory of liability under the ADA,
the next section will show that the circuit courts have been more tentative
in their approach.
B.

The Treatment of Hostile Work Environment Claims Under the ADA
in FederalCourts of Appeals

The federal courts of appeals have been more hesitant to accept the
hostile work environment claim as a cause of action under the ADA. When
faced with the issue, many circuits have opted to assume the existence of
such a cause of action rather than directly decide the question 50 These
circuits have been able to circumvent the issue because the cases have not
been factually appropriate to apply the theory. The following examples
illustrate the way the circuit courts have handled hostile work environment
under the ADA thus far.
In McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp.,5 a benefits manager
afflicted with a jaw disease filed suit against her employer, asserting

44. This alleged harassment was set forth in the unpublished December 1997 opinion of
the New Jersey Court. See Smith, supra note 4, at 24-25.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 25.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 24.
49. See, e.g., Mannell v. Am. Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(accepting the hostile work environment theory of liability, but holding that plaintiff did not
make out a prima facie claim of violation); Davis v. York Int'l Inc., 1993 WL 524761 (D.
Md. 1993) (denying the employer's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether
the employer was liable for workplace harassment under the ADA).
50. See e.g., McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 1998);
Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 1998).
51. 131F.3d558.
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various causes of actions including claims of harassment. 2 The alleged
harassment consisted of verbal comments made by McConathy's
supervisor, such as accusations that she was taking advantage of the
corporation's health benefits and warnings that McConathy's ailments
would no longer be tolerated. 3 In addition, McConathy claimed that her
supervisor excluded her from business meetings, ignored her presence in
the workplace, and encouraged her staff to keep information about business
projects from her. 4 Finally, McConathy contended that she had to defer
her much-needed jaw surgery because her supervisor would not listen to
her when she attempted to inform him of the surgery she required.5
Essentially, McConathy asserted a hostile work environment claim under
the ADA.
The district court granted Dr. Pepper's motion for summary judgment,
dismissing McConathy's hostile work environment claim sua sponte.5 6 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirned the district court's decision. 7 Regarding
the hostile work environment claim, the circuit court held that it would
assume such a cause of action existed for the sake of argument, but that it
did not consider this case factually appropriate to make an actual
determination if it constituted a legally viable claim' 8 The court clearly
indicated that McConathy should not be interpreted otherwise: "This case
should not be cited for the proposition that the Fifth Circuit recognizes or
rejects an ADA cause of action based on hostile environment
harassment."5 9 Ultimately, the court upheld the district court's order for
summary judgment because it deemed the conduct of McConathy's
supervisor as "insensitive" and "rude," but not pervasive or severe enough
to state a claim of harassment under the Title VII hostile work environment
framework.60 Therefore, the court was able to review the lower court's
decision while carefully preserving its neutrality on the issue of hostile
work environment under the ADA.
An example of a circuit court handling an ADA hostile work
environment claim in a similar manner is Wallin v. Minnesota Department
of Corrections.61 The plaintiff, Wallin, claimed that he was discriminated
against by his superiors and co-workers because of his alcoholism and

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 561.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 563-64.

61. 153 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 1998).
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depression. 62 Wallin had been discharged twice from his position as
corrections officer and reinstated twice after grievance proceedings. 63
Subsequent to his second reinstatement, Wallin filed suit alleging, among
other things, that he was subject to a hostile work environment.6 He based
his claim on "incidents of friction" between himself and his co-workers.65
Similar to the Fifth Circuit's decision in McConathy, the Eighth
Circuit in Wallin opted to assume, without deciding, that the hostile work
66
environment cause of action exists under the ADA. 6 Ultimately, the court
upheld the grant of summary judgment for the defendants because it
deemed the harassment alleged by Wallin to consist of three isolated
incidents that were not severe enough to constitute a hostile work
environment. 67 Moreover, when Wallin reported the third incident to his
employer under the harassment reporting procedures, the harassing coworker was reprimanded, and no further incidents of harassment
occurred. 6' Because of this evidence, the court held that Wallin's hostile
work environment claim could not be sustained and avoided having to
actually recognize disability harassment as a cognizable ADA claim.69
Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Southeastern Pennsylvania0
provides a more recent example of a circuit court that merely assumed the
existence of the claim, rather than explicitly stating its viability. When
analyzing Walton's harassment claim, the Third Circuit found that the
similarity between the ADA and Title VII creates a cause of action for a
hostile work environment under the ADA. 7' Nonetheless, the court decided
to "assume this cause of action without' 72confirming it because Walton did
not show that she [could] state a claim.
Walton, who suffered from depression, alleged her supervisor's
conduct and verbal remarks amounted to hostile work environment
harassment.73 Examples of harassment alleged by Walton included
repeated phone calls from her supervisor during her hospitalization to
discern when she would return to work, pressure to attend certain jobrelated functions, her supervisor's remarks that Walton was "manic
depressive," and instances where Walton's supervisor undermined her
62. Id. at 684.
63. Id. at 687.
64. Id. at 688.
65. Id.

66. The court engaged in an analysis of the hostile work environment claim without
discussing whether or not it existed under the ADA. Id. at 687-88.
67. Id. at 688.
68. Id. at n.7.
69. Id. at 688.
70. 168 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999).
71. Id. at 666.
72. Id. at 666-67.
73. Id. at 664, 667.
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relationship with her staff.7 4 While the court acknowledged that a strained
relationship existed between Walton and her supervisor, it determined that
no evidence supported the allegation that the supervisor's conduct could be
attributed to Walton's disability. 75 Therefore, despite the Third Circuit's
apparent belief that the Title VII hostile work environment framework
applies to the ADA, it declined to definitively adopt that viewpoint because
Walton did not present a factually appropriate case.
Overall, the circuit courts appear willing to recognize the hostile work
environment claim for disability harassment under the ADA if a case with
the requisite facts should arise. Yet it is noteworthy that certain circuit
court cases, such as McConathy, do not seem factually distinguishable from
district court cases that have recognized the hostile work environment
cause of action under the ADA. 76 Perhaps this is indicative of the circuit
courts' reluctance to recognize disability harassment as an avenue of relief
under the ADA. Despite such restraint, the relevant case law indicates that
the circuit courts will soon start unequivocally acknowledging the existence
of hostile work environment claims under the ADA.
C.

Newsletters Focusing on Hostile Work Environment Claims Under the
ADA

As the courts move toward recognizing ADA hostile work
environment claims, newsletters and employment reporters aimed at
advising employers are honing in on the issue by encouraging employers to
exercise heightened vigilance in monitoring harassment in the workplace.77
These publications draw on examples to make employers aware of recent
74. Id. at 667 n.4.
75. Id. at 667.
76. Like McConathy, in Haysmen v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1098 (S.D.
Ga. 1995), the supervisor accused the disabled employee of using his disability to take
advantage of the company and showed indifference to the employee's pain.
77. See, e.g., The ADA Plot Thickens, IND. EMP. L. LETrER (Baker & Daniels), Jan.
1997, at 3 (cautioning employers that they may face unexpected ADA claims); Hostile Work
Environment Claims Expanding Into New Areas, ME. EMP. L. LETrER (Moon, Moss,
McGill, Hayes & Shapiro, P.A.), Feb. 1999, at 3 (noting that some courts recognize "hostile
work environment" claims in age and disability discrimination cases); Sticks and Stones
May Break My Bones, But Names Will Net Me Cash, KAN. EMP. L. LErrER (Boyd A.
Byers), June 1999, at 5 (explaining that disability harassment claims are actionable under
ADA); Tenth Circuit,supra note 5 (advising employers that even though the 10th Circuit
did not rule that disability harassment was a cognizable claim in a case, courts will probably
recognize ADA harassment claims); When Does Teasing Cross the Line and Become
Discrimination?,N.J. EMP. L. LETTER (Pitney, Hardin, Kipp, & Szuch), Jan. 1998, at 4
(discussing ADA liability from teasing overweight worker); District Court Dismisses
Frequently Tardy Employee's ADA Claim Without a Trial, MASS. EMP. L. L=rrER (Skoler,
Abbot, & Presser), Sept. 1999, at 1 (finding that an arthritic condition constitutes a disability
under the ADA) [hereinafter DistrictCourt].
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developments in the hostile work environment area of discrimination law.
It is useful to examine these examples to ascertain what types of
harassment claims disabled employees bring under the ADA.
In one instance, an employee with an arthritic condition claimed that a
co-worker's use of an offensive computer screensaver, a memorandum
disparaging the disabled, and the defacement of his logbook created a
hostile work environment. 7' The First Circuit held that the plaintiff had not
offered enough proof to establish a hostile work environment claim under
the law. 79 However, other hostile work environment claims under the ADA
have met with more success. For example, an employee suffering from
multiple sclerosis sued her employer for tolerating a workplace
environment where her speech and gait were mimicked, for perpetuating
myths about her disability, and for fostering an atmosphere of resentment
and pity among co-workers.8 0 The newsletter points out that although the
employee's claim ultimately failed, the employer still had to defend against
it, which demonstrates the growing sense of legitimacy attached to these
claims.81
Another example of a court declining to grant summary
judgment, and therefore sending an ADA hostile work environment claim
to a jury,
involved workplace taunts and ridicule about the plaintiff's
8 2
weight.
The pervasive theme of these publications signals employers to
beware of this new development in employment discrimination law. These
newsletters aim to increase consciousness that seemingly innocent teasing
can be interpreted as harassment by a disabled employee and that
employees now have legal recourse under the ADA. This demonstrates the
practical impact of the evolution of the hostile work environment claim
under the ADA. The courts' recent receptiveness to such claims is shaping
the legal landscape of employment discrimination.
III. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN TITLE VII AND THE ADA
When courts either assume or explicitly adopt the hostile work
environment cause of action under the ADA, they generally employ the
Title VII framework8 3 In Haysman, the court utilized the elements
78. District Court,supra note 77.
79. Id.
80. The ADA Plot Thickens, supra note 77.

81. Id.
82. When Does Teasing Crossthe Line andBecome Discrimination?,supra note 77.

83. See McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998)
(noting in dicta that if the 5th Circuit decided to entertain an ADA harassment claim it
would model its approach after Title VII); Haysman v. Food Lion Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092,
1107 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (employing Title VII framework in hostile work environment ADA

claim).
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required to sustain a sexual harassment claim under Title VII to ascertain
whether the ADA hostile work environment claim was colorable under the
facts at hand. 84 The test a plaintiff must meet to establish sexual
harassment in an employment context under Title VII, as applied in
Haysman, is: "(1) the employee must be a member of a protected class, (2)
the employee must have been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the
harassment must be based on the protected characteristic, (4) the
harassment must have affected a term or condition of employment. ' s
Similarly, the McConathy court asserts: "In order to be actionable on a
hostile environment theory, disability-based harassment, like sexual
harassment, would presumably have to 'be sufficiently pervasive or severe
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment.' '8 6 Clearly, the Title VII model is being grafted onto ADA
disability harassment claims. But on what basis are courts adopting the
Title VII model?
Courts place much emphasis on the similar statutory constructions of
Title VII and the ADA, particularly the "terms and conditions" language. s7
The ADA provides, in relevant part: "No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."88
This language connects the ADA to Title VII because both statutes prohibit
discrimination in the "terms and conditions" of employment. In Title VII
cases, this language has been the foundation for the prohibition on the
hostile work environment.89
According to Frank S. Ravitch, since courts apply similar tests to Title
VII and ADEA claims when they involve similar types of discrimination, it
seems appropriate to apply the Title VII framework to ADA claims which
involve the same types of discrimination. 90 Thus, in hostile work
environment claims brought under the ADA, the Title VII test for
establishing a hostile work environment should apply. Many courts have
interpreted the ADA by analyzing and applying Title VII cases; as a result,
84. Haysman, 893 F. Supp. at 1107.
85. Id. (citing Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (1lth Cir. 1995)).
86. 131 F.3d at 563 (quoting Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d. 803,
806 (5th Cir. 1996)).
87. See id.; Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 804-05 (7th Cir. 1999); see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to... discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
").
conditions, or privileges of employment ....
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
89. See Smith, supra note 4, at 24.
90. Ravitch, supra note 3, at 1489.
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many Title VII and ADA cases discuss common ideas and arguments. 91
IV. THE DEBATE OVER EXTENDING HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
LIABILYry To THE ADA

A.

Arguments in Favorof Recognizing Hostile Work Environmentas a
Legal Cause of Action Under the ADA

In order to fulfill the goals of the ADA, proper statutory construction
demands recognition of the hostile work environment cause of action.92
This area needs uniformity and consistency, as demonstrated by the
evolution of hostile work environment liability theory in the sexual
harassment realm. Ravitch argues that the ADA lacks a consistent
structure for workplace harassment:
The ADA is applicable in all jurisdictions and many states will
look to ADA law in applying their discrimination laws to
disabled individuals. Thus, the structure given to causes of
action under the ADA will have profound implications for the
rights of disabled individuals nationwide, both under federal and
state law. 93
Ravitch illuminates the slow and confusing evolution of the Title VII
hostile work environment doctrine and points out that issues still exist
surrounding the hostile work environment cause of action that require
clarification.9 4 A lesson can be gleaned from the development of the Title
VII hostile work environment claim-when interpreting workplace
harassment claims under the ADA, a need arises for a precise and uniform
structure.95

Ravitch also analogizes between state discrimination laws and the
federal statutory scheme designed to protect certain classes from
discrimination. 96 He argues that examination of state statutory schemes
illustrates the logic of making the same causes of action available to all
protected classes under the comprehensive federal statutory scheme (i.e.,
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA) aimed at eradicating discrimination. 97
California provides an example of a state that has made workplace
91. See Davida H. Isaacs, Note, "It's Nothing Personal" - But Should it Be?: Finding
Agent Liability for Violations of the Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 22
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 505,513 (1996).
92. See discussion supraParts I.A., I.B.
93. Ravitch, supra note 3, at 1498-99.
94. Id. at 1499-1500.
95. Id. at 1500.
96. Id. at 1498.
97. Id.
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disability harassment illegal by statute. 9s The California Fair Employment
and Housing Act provides, in relevant part, that it is an unlawful
employment practice "[flor an employer.., because of race, religious
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, sex, or age, to harass an employee or
applicant." 99
State law and local codes and ordinances that provide the same
protection as the ADA often contain more liberal provisions than the
federal statute.'0 Thus, these state and local laws that provide employees
with a remedy for workplace harassment undermine the goal of
effectuating a clear national mandate to eradicate disability discrimination.
B.

Problems with Extending Hostile Work Environment Liability to the
ADA

While some view the recognition of a hostile work environment cause
of action under the ADA as a logical extension of Title VII, others maintain
101
that good reasons exist to exclude disability harassment from its scope.
Most of the arguments opposing the extension of hostile work environment
to the ADA relate to the0 fact
that the hostile work environment does not
2
apply neatly to the ADA.1
Some lawyers, while conceding the similarity of the legal framework
of the ADA and Tite VII, focus on the fact that defendants may contest the
existence of the plaintiff's disability, the hostile work environment, and the
connection between the two.'0 3 This is a complicating factor unique to the
ADA.
K. Tia Burke, a management lawyer at Philadelphia's Christie,
Pabarue, Mortensen, & Young, identifies another problem which only
applies to harassment claims brought under the ADA: "Companies
attempting to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability may
unwittingly foster discontent among co-workers who might not understand
the law's requirements. ' ' 4 The disabled employee's co-workers may
harass the employee over the "special treatment" he or she receives. Thus,
if hostile work environment claims are deemed valid under the ADA, by
complying with one facet of the ADA-the reasonable accommodation

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1497.
Id. n. 109 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h) (Deering 1994)) (emphasis added).
See Murphy, supra note 2, at 18.
See Smith, supra note 4, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at25.
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requirement-an employer may open the door to another type of violation.
The confidentiality requirements of the ADA exacerbate this difficult
situation. Some disabilities are not visible, such as epilepsy or learning
disabilities. Therefore, an employer's hands are tied by the need to
maintain confidentiality when addressing the harassing conduct of the
disabled employee's co-workers while simultaneously trying to curb the
hostile work environment.105 For example, if an employee's disability
requires him to eat frequent meals, and the employer accommodates him by
allowing him to take breaks to eat throughout the workday, his co-workers
may relentlessly taunt him. However, in attempting to dispel the
harassment, the employer may not reveal the reason behind the frequent
breaks, i.e. the employee's disability. The employer must keep that
information confidential. The ADA cautions employers to "take care to
maintain confidentiality with respect to an employee's disability" to avoid
violating the confidentiality provisions of the ADA.' °6
Opposition to hostile work environment claims under the ADA may
also center on First Amendment/censorship issues. Kingsley R. Browne, a
critic of hostile work environment liability under Title VII, contends that
by policing speech that disabled workers find offensive, courts violate the
First Amendment guarantee to free speech.0 7 Browne argues that
employers already have incentives, such as productivity and morale of
employees, to foster civility among co-workers. 0 8 Employees also have
other avenues of legal recourse against abusive co-workers.'O Therefore, a
cause of action for workplace harassment under the ADA is unnecessary,
and, moreover, unconstitutional."
As the provisions of the ADA
encourage employers to adopt a zero-tolerance stance on "politically
incorrect speech," a system of government-supported censorship is
emerging."'
Browne points out that in other arenas, like academia, unpopular
speech is protected, while speech in the workplace remains heavily
regulated.'
He attributes this to an "elitist perspective," opining that
workers' speech lacks value because workers do not convey ideas when
they speak, or that society does not view their ideas as important."'
105. Id.
106. ADA Hostile Work Environment Claim Allowed to Proceed,ARIZ. EMP. L. LETrER

(Lewis & Roca LLP), June 1997, at 5.
107. Smith, supra note 4, at 25.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the FirstAmendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 482 (1991).
113. Id.
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Speakers who violate Title VII because of their expressed views on race
and sex are being punished for their social attitudes.!14 Browne labels such
speech in the workplace as "political."'1 5 Yet, the threat of litigation and
the constantly evolving Title VII jurisprudence produces a chilling effect
on such speech.'16 Although Browne's arguments against hostile work
environment liability are directed at Title VII, they also apply to the ADA.
Expression about the roles of the disabled in society can also be
categorized as political speech, just like workers' views on race and sex.
V.

THE RAVrrCH PROPOSAL: APPLICATION OF A MODIFIED TITLE VII
FRAMEWORK TO ADA HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS

Ravitch acknowledges that the hostile work environment framework
used for Title VII claims provides a good basis for an ADA disability
harassment scheme." 7 However, Ravitch proposes several modifications
necessary to adapt the framework to the unique facets of disability
discrimination."'
In addition, Ravitch examines the EEOC Proposed
Guidelines, which protect disabled individuals as well as other classes,
from workplace harassment.

19

He argues that they, too, are lacking; in

114. Id. at 500.
115. Id. at 497.
116. Id. at506-07.
117. Ravitch, supra note 3, at 1500.
118. Id.
119. Ravitch cites the EEOC Proposed Guidelines in part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age,
or disability constitutes discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment ....
(b)(1) Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows
hostility or aversion toward an individual because of his/her race, color,
religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability, or that of his/her relatives,
friends, or associates, and that:
(i) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment;
(ii) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance; or
(iii)
Otherwise
opportunities...

adversely

affects

an

individual's

employment

(c) The standard for determining whether verbal or physical conduct relating to
race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive work environment is whether a
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would find the conduct
intimidating, hostile, or abusive. The "reasonable person" standard includes
consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim's race, color,
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their breadth, they fail to address the unique circumstances of disabled
employees and the specific language of the ADA.1 20 Using the Title VII
framework coupled with the EEOC Proposed Guidelines as a starting point,
Ravitch constructs a model framework to be applied to hostile work
environment causes of action brought under the ADA.
First, to reap the benefit of Title I of the ADA, which prohibits
discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, the
employee or applicant must show that he/she is a qualified individual with
a disability. 2 1 The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability"
as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires. 1 22 Ravitch observes that this
requirement for a prima facie case of hostile work environment liability
under the ADA is neither addressed in Title VII nor in the EEOC Proposed
Guidelines because it only applies to disabled individuals, not to other
protected classes.'2'
Ravitch also criticizes the objective reasonableness standard. While
the EEOC's more flexible "reasonable person in the same or similar
circumstances" standard is more appropriate for claims brought under the
ADA than a strict objective reasonableness standard, and despite that
Ravitch finds the EEOC standard to be "well-thought out," he finds the
standard in need of modification because it is likely to be subject to
inconsistent interpretation.124 Ravitch also notes that the EEOC Proposed
Guidelines alter the structure of the Title VII framework in a confusing
manner because the guidelines do not clearly state that the harassment must
alter the terms and conditions of employment. 25 That language constitutes
the cornerstone of the hostile work environment cause of action.
Ravitch resolves these perceived flaws in the EEOC framework by
proposing that the second requirement of a prima facie hostile work
environment claim under the ADA be the following:
[W]hether the individual was, or is, subject to intimidating,
hostile, or abusive conduct based on a known disability, which
that individual perceived, and a reasonableperson with the same
disability would consider, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, thereby

religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability ....
Id. at 1501-02.
120. Id. at 1502.
121. Id. at 1503.
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 2000).
123. Ravitch, supranote 3, at 1503.
124. Id. at 1504.
125. Id.
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126
creating a hostile or abusive work environment.

Ravitch finds this component of the appropriate framework for ADA
harassment claims to be ideal because it encompasses the uniqueness of the
ADA, the Title VII structure, and the EEOC's definition of the conduct
sufficient to create a hostile work environment. 12' In addition, the
"reasonable person with the same disability" standard captures the
precision necessary in this area of law to avoid needless uncertainty and
confusion.'2
Ravitch finds the terms "reasonable person" and "reasonable person in
the same or similar circumstances" to be inherently confusing because they
can be interpreted in several different ways. 29 The "reasonable person
with the same disability" standard emphasizes the individual, whereas the
more general standard groups all disabled individuals into one
classification. 30 This ignores the fact that the ADA covers a myriad of
disabilities, and that specific sensitivities attach to specific disabilities.!"
To fulfill the purpose of the ADA, the standard must take into account the
unique aspects of different disabilities.3 This is illustrated by the example
that an epileptic and a paraplegic might not take offense to the same
conduct or comments. 133 According to Ravitch, the "reasonable person
with the same disability standard" is flexible enough to account for
discrimination aimed at general or narrow classifications, but is not open to
different interpretations.134
Ravitch addresses one potential criticism of his modified standardnamely, the evidentiary difficulty of establishing that a reasonable person
with the same disability as the plaintiff would perceive the work
environment as hostile.1 5
He advocates using resources such as
organizations that help the disabled, psychological studies that address the
needs and sensitivities of individuals with certain disabilities, and even
allowing individuals possessing the same disability as the alleged victim to
testify.1 36 As a last resort, if the plaintiff's disability is extremely rare,
126. Id. at 1504-05 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1505.
128. Id. at 1505-06.
129. Ravitch acknowledges that the standards could be construed to mean a reasonable
person with the same disability, but cautions they could also mean any reasonable disabled
individual, any individual with a disability affecting the same life function that is affected
by the plaintiff's disability, or a reasonable nondisabled person's perception of how he/she
would react if he/she were in the same circumstances as the disabled plaintiff. Id. at 1506.
130. Id. at 1508.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1506-07.
135. Id. at 1507.
136. Id.
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reasonable persons with a disability affecting the same life function should
be permitted to testify. 137 Despite difficulties that might arise in trying to
obtain insight into the perceptions of a reasonable person with the same
remains adamant that a more general standard is
disability, Ravitch
138
inadequate.
Ravitch's third proposed modification pertains to the reasonable
accommodation requirement of the ADA. 139 Ravitch provides examples of
how this unique provision of the ADA may become intertwined with
hostile work environment claims.140 For instance, an employer may fail to
supervise a mentally disabled employee who requested extra sensitivity and
guidance in order to perform his/her job functions."4 The requested extra
sensitivity and supervision are reasonable accommodations, and failure to
provide them could be considered intimidating, hostile, or abusive; thus, a
hostile work environment may be created. 142 Another example is failure to
move an employee with a respiratory disorder to a smoke-free
environment.'43 In a different situation, an employer may provide an
accommodation, but implement it in such a way that contributes to a hostile
work environment. For example, by placing a special chair in a
conspicuous location, an employer may expose a disabled employee to
unnecessary ridicule from co-workers.' 44 In all of the above cases, the
hostile work environment claims have merged with the failure to
accommodate.
The failure to make reasonable accommodations needs to be
incorporated into the framework of a hostile work environment claim under
the ADA. It is noteworthy that if an employer transfers a disabled
employee to another location as part of a reasonable accommodation (e.g.,
an employee with emphysema is transferred out of an environment where
smoking is permitted and co-workers intentionally smoked more around the
disabled employee), no ADA violation exists. 45 Instead, the transfer
constitutes a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 146 This situation
is unlike transferring an employee away from harassers to alleviate racial or
sexual harassment, which courts have deemed a violation of Title VII

137. Id. at 1508.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1509.
140. "Failure to reasonably accommodate can contribute to a hostile work environment,
or in rare situations, even create such an environment." Id. at 1510.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1512.
144. Id. at 1511.
145. Id. at 1512-13.
146. Id. at 1513.
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because it punishes the victim for the harasser's conduct. 47
Ravitch's proposal also covers the employer liability issue for hostile
work environment under the ADA. He points out that while both the
EEOC and the courts have addressed this, a lack of consistency exists in
this area.14' The EEOC Proposed Guidelines attempt to clarify employer
liability for hostile work environment.
According to Ravitch's
interpretation of the Proposed Guidelines, an employer is liable for the acts
of its agents or supervisory employees "where the supervisory employee
alleged to be the harasser is acting in an agency capacity, or when the
employer knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action.1 49 In addition, employers
would be liable for the behavior of the victim's coworkers if the employer,
its agents, or supervisory employees knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take corrective action. 5 ° Ravitch contends that
while Title VII case law and the EEOC Proposed Guidelines regarding
employer liability can be applied to the ADA, the standard must be slightly
modified to appropriately apply it in the ADA context.'
Ravitch highlights the language of the ADA which mandates that
employers must maintain adequate anti-harassment policies and appropriate
methods of administering such policies. 152 Methods of administration
include both action and inaction. 53 The ADA, as interpreted by Ravitch,
dictates that the employer should be held strictly liable for any conduct that
creates a hostile work environment if an employer does not implement
clear policies against workplace harassment, or 15if
an employer fails to
4
implement appropriate methods of administration.
Ravitch also discusses the defenses to a claim of failure to reasonably
accommodate-a claim which is unique to the ADA 5 Such defenses
include "undue hardship" (where the employer must establish that
reasonably accommodating the disabled employee would place a heavy
burden on the employer's business) and "good faith efforts" (where the
147. Id.
148. The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex suggest a strict liability
standard for supervisors and agents of the employers. For harassment by co-workers, the
guidelines impose liability if the employer knew or should have known of the harassing
conduct and failed to take remedial action. However, the Supreme Court rejected the strict
liability standard in favor of general agency principals. See Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-73 (1986). As a result, courts have applied varying standards when
assessing employer liability. Ravitch, supra note 3, at 1514.
149. Id. at 1514-15.
150. Id. at 1515.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1516.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1516-17.
155. Id. at 1517-18.

736

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 3:3

employer must show that it consulted with the disabled employee in an
attempt to identify and provide a reasonable accommodation). 56 These
defenses become relevant to employer liability in hostile work environment
claims under the ADA when one combines a claim of disability harassment
with a claim for failure to accommodate. 15 7 According to Ravitch, even if
an employer successfully defends against a claim for failure to reasonably
accommodate, and the failure to accommodate constituted a component of
the hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff's hostile work
environment claim is not necessarily stymied: "If the remaining allegations
are sufficient to maintain the cause of action for hostile work environment,
the complainant should be able to proceed ....
Obviously, this concept
is unique to causes of action brought under the ADA.
Therefore, Ravitch would adopt the test for employer liability
currently contained within the EEOC Proposed Guidelines; however, he
would expand it to clarify that, under the ADA, the employer would be
strictly liable if its methods of administration enable the "creation or
perpetuation of harassment." '59 In addition, a rebuttable presumption exists
that the methods of administration create or perpetuate harassment if the
employer fails to implement an effective policy against harassment,
complaint procedures, sanctions against harassers, and training dealing
with disability harassment. 160 All policies and procedures must be
communicated to all of the employers' agents and employees in order to be
deemed effective.161 Moreover, as discussed above, the ADA defenses may
be successfully asserted by the employer in response to a failure to
accommodate claim; however, as long as the remaining evidence
(excluding evidence of the employer's failure to accommodate) sufficiently
sustains a hostile work environment claim, the hostile work environment
62
claim may proceed independent of the failure to accommodate claim.
By modifying the Title VII hostile work environment framework,
Ravitch proposes a model to be applied to hostile work environment claims
brought under the ADA. He contends that his proposal should silence any
attacks on the viability of hostile work environment claims related to
disability harassment.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 1518.
Id.
Id. at 1518-19.
Id. at 1520.
Id.
Id.
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VI. SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS

I advocate the adoption of the Ravitch model pursuant to slight
modifications in the area of employer liability because the law in that area
has changed since Ravitch created his proposal.
Hostile work environment liability is necessary to effectuate the goals
and purposes of the ADA, as outlined in Part I above. The striking
similarity of the language of Title VII and the ADA indicates legislative
intent to base workplace harassment on illegal disability discrimination. It
is important to note that Congress chose to include the "terms and
conditions" clause in the ADA's definition of discrimination because it was
aware that Title VII hostile work environment claims are predicated on that
language. Thus, it follows logically that if Congress did not intend to make
disability harassment actionable under the ADA, it would have deleted the
"terms and conditions" phrase from the statute. Statutory construction
coupled with legislative intent creates a strong argument in favor of
extending the hostile work environment theory to the ADA.
Arguments opposing such an extension fall into two distinct
categories: 1) arguments that are moot in light of the Ravitch proposal, and
2) arguments that attack the hostile work environment theory itself rather
than its application to the ADA. 163 Neither type of argument is persuasive.
For example, the notion that the Title VII hostile work environment
framework is incompatible with the ADA is derived from the belief that
hostile work environment liability is too complicated to be asserted in ADA
cases. Though harassment claims under the ADA may be more complex
than similar claims brought under Title VII, that alone does not constitute a
sufficient reason to leave disabled individuals without a remedy for
Without legal recourse, harassed disabled
workplace harassment.
employees will be powerless to resist or gain compensation, and the goals
of the ADA will be thwarted. Moreover, the Ravitch proposal illustrates
how a few minor changes to the Title VII framework can mold it into a
useful model for hostile work environment claims under the ADA.
An argument also exists which asserts that providing reasonable
accommodation for disabled employees, in compliance with the ADA, may
lead to resentment among the employee's co-workers over "special
treatment." ' 64 This resentment could itself manifest and sustain a hostile
work environment, creating a "catch-22" for the employer. By complying
with the law, he may be creating a situation that violates the law. Again,
the Ravitch proposal takes into account the interrelationship between
reasonable accommodation and harassment.

163. See supraPart IV.B.
164. Smith, supra note 4, at 25.
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Even if the proposal had not addressed this concern, I would still find
that this argument lacked merit. Resentment and hostility of other
employees should never constitute an acceptable reason for an employer to
discriminate against an employee in a protected class. Would anyone argue
that a woman who works in a male-dominated industry is not entitled to
bring a hostile work environment claim if her male co-workers resent her
presence in the workplace? Or that an African-American should not be
allowed to bring a racial harassment claim because his or her fellow
employees resent him or her? It is doubtful that such an argument would
succeed, and disabled employees should not be treated any differently than
other protected groups under the law. This is especially true considering
that the ADA was enacted to give disabled individuals the same
opportunities and protections against discrimination enjoyed by members
of other protected classes.
The Ravitch proposal does not address the confidentiality concern
raised in connection with the extension of hostile work environment
liability to the ADA. The essence of the argument is that because an
employer cannot disclose that an employee is disabled, he will be unable to
stop disability harassment when the disability is not obvious. For example,
if a dyslexic employee's co-workers relentlessly taunt him as "stupid" and
"retarded," and the employer knows about the harassment, the employer
could be held liable for a hostile work environment. However, in order to
stop the harassment, according to the argument, the employer would need
to reveal the employee's disability.
The simple solution to this problem is that the employer should
promulgate rules and policies mandating professional behavior in the
workplace. It is not necessary to divulge an employee's disability to
maintain a harassment-free workplace. A clear policy against verbal or
other forms of harassment suffices. The employer should strive to
emphatically communicate to his or her employees that harassment of any
kind is not appropriate in the workplace. In addition, the requirement that
the harassment be severe and pervasive enough to alter or interfere with the
terms and conditions of employment serves to combat the confidentiality
problem. An offhand remark to a dyslexic employee or an isolated incident
will not trigger employer liability. In cases where severe disability
harassment constitutes a hostile work environment, it is likely that the
harassers will know of the disabled employee's disability-either because
it is obvious or because the employee disclosed it him or herself.
The final argument raised in opposition to the hostile work
environment cause of action under the ADA is the First Amendment/free
speech argument. 65 This constitutional attack seeks to shake the

165. Id.
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foundation of the entire hostile work environment framework, including
harassment claims brought under Title VII. However, it does not
specifically apply to the hostile work environment under the ADA issue.
Therefore, until the courts choose to address this issue as it applies to
hostile work environments in general, it is not relevant to this topic.
Although my ultimate conclusion is to adopt the Ravitch model of
hostile work environment under the ADA, I do not adopt it in its entirety.
Because Ravitch discusses employer liability for the actions of supervisory
employees, and the law has changed since Ravitch addressed this, the
model must be modified. Recently, the Supreme Court clarified the
standard for employer liability in two landmark companion cases:
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 66 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth. 67
In Faragher,the court held that an employer is vicariously liable for
harassment of an employee by a supervisor, subject to an affirmative
defense. 61 In that case, the plaintiff was a lifeguard whose immediate
superiors verbally and physically harassed her. 169
The lifeguards'
employment hierarchy was structured in a para-military chain of command,
where the lifeguards worked at a remote location with no real contact with
or access to higher-status city officials. 170 Although the city maintained a
policy, it failed to disseminate it to the lifeguards working at Faragher's site
of employment171
The Faraghercourt recognized the need for a more stringent standard
of employer liability than negligence, so it adapted agency principles to
reach the following holding: "An employer is subject to vicarious liability
to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with.., authority over the employee., 172 When no tangible
employment act exists, for example, in a hostile work environment case
where the employee is not fired, denied promotion, or the like, the
employer may raise an affirmative defense. 73
The defense is comprised of two elements: "(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."1 74 Because the holding in
166.
167.
168.
169.

524 U.S. 775 (1998).
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
524 U.S. at 780.
Id. at780-81.

170. Id. at 781.
171. Id. at781-82.
172. Id. at 807.

173. Id.
174. Id.
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Faragher decision, I will
Burlington Industries closely resembles the
15
refrain from describing the facts of that case. 1
The Ravitch proposal was somewhat nebulous on the issue of
employer liability. As the law has evolved since the inception of the
Ravitch proposal, the new standard of employer liability, articulated in
Faragherand Burlington Industries,must be incorporated into the Ravitch
model.
The courts should adopt the updated Ravitch model for a hostile work
liability cause of action under the ADA. The case law in the area indicates
that disability harassment presents a problem in the employment arena, and
is not going to solve itself. The law must confront it directly and send a
clear message that such discrimination is illegal under the ADA and will
not be tolerated. The current uncertainty in this area of the law is
incompatible with the goals and purposes of the ADA.

175. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 752, 765 (1998) (holding, similarly,
that an employer may raise an affirmative defense comprised of the two elements described
by the Faraghercourt).

